CONSTITUTIONAL

IMMUNITY-CONGRESS'S
LAW-SOVEREIGN
ARTICLE I POWERS MAY NOT ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY GRANTED BY THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND EX
PARTE YOUNG IS INAPPLICABLE TO SUITS BROUGHT UNDER THE
INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY AcT-Seminole Tribe v. Florida,

116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
The concept of sovereign immunity' predates the formation of a
federal government in the United States. Initially founded on the belief
I See John F. Duffy, Comment, Sovereign Immunity, The Officer Suit Fiction, and
Entitlement Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 295, 295 (1989) (describing sovereign immunity
as a "constitutional doctrine... [that] prohibits a federal court from entertaining any
suits in which a sovereign entity, either a state or the United States, is named as defendant
unless the sovereign has consented to be sued") (footnotes omitted). Duffy explains that
this grant of immunity is not absolute because there are several limiting doctrines, such as
statutory consent. See id. at 298; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 3-25, at 173 (2d ed. 1988) (commenting that sovereign immunity is a controversial
limitation on the jurisdiction that federal courts may exercise over state defendants);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (defining sovereign immunity as a
-judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government without its
consent").
See generally Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 78-88 (1988) (discussing the
Eleventh Amendment's constitutional breadth and the background of sovereign immunity
jurisprudence in the United States).
Professor Tribe questions whether the Eleventh Amendment actually
constitutionalizes sovereign immunity. See TRIBE, supra, at 173. Tribe does, however,
consider the Eleventh Amendment to be at the core of the controversy between state
sovereignty and federalism. See id. Tribe explains:
The [E]leventh [A]mendment lies at the center of the tension between state
sovereign immunity and the desire to have in place mechanisms for the
effective vindication of federal rights. The Supreme Court has negotiated
this tension both by resort to legal fictions and through complex and often
counterintuitive interpretations of the [E]leventh [Almendment that have
made that amendment far more controversial than its language would, on
its face, suggest.
Id. Professors John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda agree with Tribe's definition of
sovereign immunity, adding that the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment
expands and contracts by virtue of the Supreme Court's interpretation devices. See JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §2.11, at 44 (5th ed. 1995).

Professors Nowak and Rotunda qualify their interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as
a grant of sovereign immunity by explaining that the Amendment only prevents suits from
being heard in federal court. See id.As such, some federal rights may still be vindicated
in state court. See id. This, of course, begs the question of whether state judges, who
rely on the state for their sustenance, should be entrusted with the sole power to
adjudicate these federal claims. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 1889, 1951 (1983)
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that the King enjoyed immunity from all private suits, 4 some scholars
argue that the Tenth Amendment5 incorporated sovereign immunity into
("'circumstancesof the states themselves being parties, it might, . . . be plausibly argued,
that the judges of the state courts were not free from bias'") (quoting Hunter v. Martin,
18 Va. (4 Munf.) 11, 11 (1814)).
2 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1146 (1996)
(Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing CLYDE E. JACOBS,

THE ELEvENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY 5 (1972)) (dating sovereign immunity to at least the thirteenth century); see
also Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health and
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 288 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result) ("Sovereign
immunity is a common-law doctrine that long predates our Constitution and the Eleventh
Amendment.").
For purposes of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, a federal government is
defined as a "system of government administered in a nation formed by a union or
confederation of several independent states." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 611 (6th ed.
1990) (emphasis added); see also Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment
represents the understanding that while the states are part of a union they still retain some
of the privileges of individual sovereigns, particularly sovereign immunity). Tension
results from this relationship between state governments and the federal government
because while there are times when a state may properly invoke its sovereign immunity
there are also instances when that immunity must be relinquished in the interest of
preserving federalism. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 286 (noting that the Constitution
dictates a delicate balance between state and federal power).
3 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660-61 n.9 (1974)
(noting that various
members of the Constitutional Convention, particularly James Madison, John Marshall,
and Alexander Hamilton, objected to the idea of subjecting states to suits brought by
private individuals). But see Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 438
U.S. 468, 505 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that there is little evidence
suggesting that the Framers of the Constitution were against subjecting nonconsenting
states to suit); Christopher T. Graebe, The Federalism of James Iredell in Historical
Context, 69 N.C. L. REv. 251, 254-58 (1990) (suggesting that some of the Framers
argued that Article III granted jurisdiction over suits in which a state was a party).
See John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U.L. REv. 1121,
1124-25
(1993) (discussing the common-law fiction that the "King can do no wrong" and the
actual implication of that statement-that while the King can certainly do wrong there was
no higher authority to whom the King would answer); see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 437, 446 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (discussing the historical roots
of state immunity from compulsory suits). But see Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1, 3 (1963) (noting
that in practice, the doctrine of sovereign immunity rarely barred private suits in England
prior to 1789 because the petition of right, a device designed to allow relief against the
government and specifically the King, was available).
Justice Holmes offered an alternative explanation of the sovereign immunity doctrine
stating that "[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides that "Ithe powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.; see also Calvin R. Massey,
State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 66
(1989) (explaining the view that the Tenth Amendment secured the states' right to
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Others claim the protection of sovereign immunity did

not derive from the Constitution or the Bill of Rights but rather from the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. 7

Regardless of its genesis,

ratification of the Eleventh Amendment and, arguably, the
constitutionalization of the sovereign immunity defense can be traced to
the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,s a controversial

ruling that allowed a citizen to sue the State of Georgia for satisfaction of
a debt. 9
sovereign immunity and that the Eleventh Amendment primarily regarded only
jurisdictional concerns). But see Duffy, supra note 1, at 297 n.16 (noting that sovereign
immunity was conferred on the states via the Eleventh Amendment).
6 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 445-46 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (explaining that
individual states, by adopting the Constitution, did not completely forfeit their
sovereignty). But see id. at 452 (Blair, J., concurring) ("A State, by adopting the
Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States, [sihe
has, in that respect, given up her right of [slovereignty."); id. at 476 (Jay, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that the words of the Constitution are "expre[s]s, po[slitive, free from
ambiguity, and without room for ... implied expre[sslions").
See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "Ithe
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
The language of the Eleventh Amendment is silent on the issue of sovereign
immunity. See Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1894, 1895. Based on the language of Article
III, the Constitution did not initially provide for sovereign immunity and the addition of
the Eleventh Amendment did not explicitly grant states immunity from all suits in federal
court. See id. Some critics maintain that the text should be read as written, without
embellishment from originalists who contend that the Amendment was fashioned to
provide states with sovereign immunity. See Michael P. Kenny, Sovereign Immunity and
the Rule of Law: Aspiring to a Highest-Ranked View of the Eleventh Amendment, 1 GEo.
MASON INDEP. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1992). Kenny explains:
[tihere is absolutely no reason to believe, therefore, that the drafters and
ratifiers of the Eleventh Amendment intended to immunize states from
federal or constitutional causes of action. Moreover, had the drafters and
ratifiers intended such broad immunity, it is more reasonable to assume
that they would have drafted an amendment that would have expressly
barred suits by citizens of the defendant state ....
Such an amendment,
in fact, was proposed but was rejected.
Id. (footnote omitted).
9 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
See William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1261, 1262, 1263 (1989) [hereinafter Fletcher, The
Diversity Explanation] (noting that although scholars generally agree that the Eleventh
Amendment was passed in response to Chisholm, debate abounds over the original intent
of its authors).
There are several theories regarding analysis of the Eleventh
Amendment. See id. Among these theories include the diversity theory, the plain
meaning theory, and the more traditional interpretation based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Hans v. Louisiana. See id. at 1261-63; William A. Fletcher, Exchange on the
Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 131 (1990) [hereinafter Fletcher,
Exchange]; see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment as a constitutional grant of sovereign immunity).
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Supporters of the diversity theory insist that, based on the historical roots of the
Eleventh Amendment, the Amendment intended to bar jurisdiction only in diversity of
citizenship cases and not all private suits. See Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation,
supra, at 1264. William Fletcher, for example, noted that when the Eleventh Amendment
was ratified, the authors intended to repeal Article III's grant of diverse citizen-state
jurisdiction over state defendants. See Fletcher, Exchange, supra, at 131 ("The diversity
explanation holds that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to repeal the part of [the]
state-citizen diversity clause of Article III that had conferred party-based jurisdiction over
unconsented suits brought against the states by out-of-state citizens or aliens." (footnote
omitted)). As an advocate of the diversity theory, John J. Gibbons stressed that the
Supreme Court should acknowledge its earlier "misinterpretation" of the Eleventh
Amendment as a constitutional grant of sovereign immunity and overrule Hans. See
Gibbons, supra note 1, at 2004.
Plain meaning advocates, in contrast, suggest that the Eleventh Amendment should
be read as it is written. See Steven Breker-Cooper, The Eleventh Amendment: A Textual
Solution, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1481, 1483 (1992) (arguing that the Eleventh
"[A]mendment can be understood if only it is read literally"); Lawrence C. Marshall,
Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1342, 1342 (1989)
(noting that "[t]he amendment could hardly be clearer in precluding federal jurisdiction
only in suits brought against a state by 'Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State'"); Massey, supra note 5, at 65 ("1 propose that we take
Eleventh Amendment text and the history of its enactment at face value. The amendment
sought to create a party based denial of jurisdiction to the federal courts that sweeps
across all the jurisdictional heads of Article III"). Unfortunately, these textualists do not
agree about what the words of the Eleventh Amendment actually mean. See, e.g.,
Fletcher, Exchange, supra, at 132 (comparing the interpretations offered by both
Marshall and Massey).
Proponents of the Hans interpretation, in contrast, suggest that the immediate
passage of the Eleventh Amendment indicated an overwhelming disapproval of states
being subjected to suits by private individuals. See Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the
Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the HistoricalRationale of the Seventh Amendment, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013, 1044 (1994). According to advocates of this view, the
immediate passage of the Eleventh Amendment clearly indicated the Framers's intent to
shield states from suit even though the language did not explicitly grant states the
privilege of sovereign immunity. See Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation, supra, at
1291. Furthermore, advocates of the Hans theory, including a majority of present
Supreme Court members, maintained that Hans and its progeny did not significantly
threaten federal interests. See Ann Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal
Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 1123, 1156 (1989). Althouse
suggests that based on the dictates of stare decisis, the present Supreme Court will
continue to follow Hans in its Eleventh Amendment interpretation unless there is a
significant showing that adherence to Hans will detrimentally affect federal interests. See
id.
Justice Scalia, a supporter of the Hans interpretation, explained that overruling Hans
would conflict with the dictates of stare decisis and require the Supreme Court to overrule
and disapprove of numerous cases. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 3435 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Scalia argued that Congress relied
on Eleventh Amendment immunity when it created certain legislation. See id. at 35
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Laurence Tribe, in his analysis of the Eleventh Amendment,
stated that "restoring an historically correct understanding of the [Ejleventh
[Almendment, would inevitably disrupt the entire complex of doctrines . .. surrounding
the balance of power between the states and the federal government." See TRIBE, supra
note 1, § 3-25, at 175 n.8 (citation omitted) (noting that although the diversity jurisdiction
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Today, the Eleventh Amendment limits private actions brought
against states in federal court 10 by preventing the exercise of both
12
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction' and federal question jurisdiction
over state defendants.13 In so acting, the Amehdment safeguards the
Left unchecked, however,
integrity and dignity of states as sovereigns.
the Eleventh Amendment could provide total immunity for a state's
Consequently,
actions against its own citizens and those of other states.
fictions
the United States Supreme Court has created a number of legal
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is well-supported, the Supreme Court is
unlikely to change its current analysis of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
10 See Massey, supra note 5, at 62. The Eleventh Amendment is a "presumptive
jurisdictional bar to private claims in federal court against states." Id.
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). Section 1332 provides a forum in federal court
for
citizens of different states to settle their disputes. See id.
12 See id. § 1331. Section 1331 grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving
conflicts "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
13 See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (quoting Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) ("The Eleventh Amendment
confirms that 'the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial
authority in Art. Ill.'"); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that "[the judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, . .. to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State
and Citizens of another State .... [and] all Cases ... in which a State shall be a Party
See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
146 (1993); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).
See generally Michael G. Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 212 (1988) (reviewing JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE UNITED STATEs-THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY

(1987)) (dealing with the concern that the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment
impairs a state's public accountability and that violations of federal law may go
unchecked).
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Eleventh Amendment: A Comment on the Decisions During the 1988-89 Term, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 321, 344 (1990) (stating that the present debate between members of the
Supreme Court focuses on the importance of state immunity and the role of state
accountability); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 61, 62 (1984) (stating that the idea of the government
being accountable to the public for its actions "is at war" with the Supreme Court's
present interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as the constitutional embodiment of the
sovereign immunity doctrine.)
16 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 894 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a legal
fiction as a
"situation contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a matter"). The usage of
legal fictions has been criticized by several commentators. See Gibbons, supra note 1, at
2003-04 (arguing that the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment has been largely
political and that "the amendment's contours were shaped not by doctrinal reasoning but
by the political exigencies of the times."); see also Massey, supra note 5, at 69, 71
(suggesting that these legal fictions, adopted to stop states from trampling on individual
federal rights, may indeed create more problems then they solve).
Justice Brennan criticized the Supreme Court's usage of legal fictions in Atascadero
State Hospitalv. Scanlon where the Justice suggested that the Court should simply correct
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to discourage states from behaving inappropriately.1 7 These legal devices
disguise suits against the states by permitting citizens' recourse against
their state governors or alternatively by implying the state's consent to
suit.18 The Supreme Court's employment of these legal fictions has led
its Eleventh Amendment interpretation rather than rely on judicially-constructed legal
fictions. See 473 U.S. 234, 258 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further
explained:
The Court's sovereign immunity doctrine has other unfortunate results.
Because the doctrine is inconsistent with the essential function of the
federal courts---to provide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform
interpretation and enforcement of the supreme law of the land-it has led
to the development of a complex body of technical rules made necessary
by the need to circumvent the intolerable constriction of federal jurisdiction
that would otherwise occur.
Id. at 255-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Presently, a state may not be subjected to suit in federal court. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. Its officers, acting in their official capacity however, may be sued for
injunctive relief, though generally not for money damages. See Will v. Michigan Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 89-90 (1989). Regarding money damages, prospective
relief is allowed while retroactive relief is denied. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
664-65 (1974). The Supreme Court has also on occasion implied state consent to suit
thereby waiving a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when certain claims would
otherwise be barred. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964)
(noting that Alabama agreed to suit when it chose to engage in the operation of an
interstate railroad).
17 See Duffy, supra note 1, at 295. Historically, the Supreme
Court has authorized
suits against states in several situations: (1) suits authorized by the state legislature
effecting a kind of waiver of sovereign immunity or otherwise consented to by a state; (2)
suits based on violations of federal law by individual state actors acting under color of
law; and (3) suits allowed by Congress. See id. at 295, 299; see also Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (allowing abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment
defense based on Congress's Commerce Clause powers); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976) (allowing abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment defense based on the
Fourteenth Amendment); Parden, 377 U.S. at 189, 192-93 (finding an implied waiver of
consent based on the state's operation of an interstate railroad); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 159, 160 (1908) (holding that an officer suit may be maintained against state
officials when the defendant acts beyond his authority and the plaintiff is seeking
injunctive relief ); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (holding that voluntary
appearance of state defendants confers jurisdiction via consent).
See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159, 160 (allowing a suit in which
the
defendant officer acted beyond his authority and the plaintiff sought injunctive relief);
Parden, 377 U.S. at 189, 192-93 (finding an implied waiver of consent when a state
operates an interstate railroad).
It is permissible for the federal government to sue a state. See United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (states are not shielded from suits by the
federal government). The Supreme Court also permits sister states to sue each other.
See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 316 (1904) (states consent to suits by
other states based on a mutual concession of a right to sue). Additionally, Congress may
intervene and abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223,
228 (1989); accord Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238. But see Massey, supra note 5, at 6364. Massey states:

812

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:806

to conflicting interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment's scope.19
Allowing states the option of consenting to suit20 has further
compromised the Eleventh Amendment's supposed jurisdictional bar to
suits brought by private citizens 1 Ultimately, this has forced federal

courts to determine when, for the purposes of Eleventh Amendment
analysis, a state is being sued 22 and thus
23 whether a state defendant may
utilize the sovereign immunity defense.
[ilfthe

[Eleventh]

[Almendment

constitutionalized

state sovereign

immunity, it did so not by creating a waivable immunity doctrine, but by
carving out of the federal judicial power a class of cases: private claims
against states.
As a result of this prohibition upon subject matter
jurisdiction, the federal judiciary lacks any constitutional authority to hear
and decide such cases. It is a miraculous doctrine that enables either
Congress or a litigant state to confer this authority.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See Lawrence C. Marshall, Commentary, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh
Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1342, 1351 (1989).
Although the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment is heavily disputed, stare decisis presents a separate problem of
whether history mandates acceptance of the Hans interpretation of the Amendment. See
Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v.
Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REv., 1260, 1260, 1261-62 (1990). Justice Brennan, noting
the conflicting interpretations, stated that:
Itlhe doctrine that thus has been created is pernicious. In an era when
sovereign immunity has been generally recognized by courts and
legislatures as an anachronistic and unnecessary remnant of a feudal legal
system .... The Court has aggressively expanded its scope. [ ] Yet the
[Court's] current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of liberty under law by
protecting the States from the consequences of their illegal conduct. And
the decision obstructs the sound operation of our federal system by limiting
the ability of Congress to take steps it deems necessary and proper to
achieve national goals within its constitutional authority.
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (citations omitted).
20 See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964) (explaining that
the State of Alabama necessarily consented to suit by operating an interstate railroad);
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (suggesting that state defendants consent to
suit when they voluntarily appear in court).
21 See Massey, supra note 5, at 64. Allowing states to consent creates another
problem in Eleventh Amendment analysis; arguably, if the Eleventh Amendment alters
Article III's grant of jurisdiction to federal courts, then a party's consent would be
irrelevant. See Althouse, supra note 9, at 1160-61. For an in-depth discussion of states
consenting to private suits and judicially implied consent, see supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
22 See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 2.11, at 47-48 (explaining
that although
the state is entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection, subdivisions of the state such as
municipal corporations and school boards may not invoke the Eleventh Amendment's
jurisdictional bar).
The distinction is made that "[i]f an entity is ... merely [an]
instrumentality of state government it shares the immunity, but.., if it is a politically
independent unit," then the suit may proceed without raising an Eleventh Amendment
issue. Id.
23 See Althouse, supra note 9, at 1139. Althouse explains "[t]hat Hans and Young
make such an unattractive and troublesome pair . . .for the majority of the Court [and
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Recently, this debate has crystallized over the analysis of states'
relations with Indian Tribes. 24 The unique position of Indian Tribes as
"dependent sovereigns"' 25 has confused dispute resolution between these
two entities26 and created additional controversy in the on-going Eleventh
that] both decisions uphold important constitutional values that cannot be sacrificed. The
cost of this awkward coexistence is severe doctrinal disarray." Id. at 1140 (footnotes
omitted).
The Supreme Court's steadfast commitment to these clearly conflicting
decisions places Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in a constant state of "confusion,
contradiction, and incoherence." Id. at 1139. But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S.
Ct. 1114, 1122, 1132 (1996) (stating that both Ex parte Young and Hans are still valuable
precedents).
The legal fictions that make up the Eleventh Amendment doctrine are necessary to
balance individual state sovereignty with federal interests. See Althouse, supra note 9, at
1139. Yet, there remains the concern that any distinction between allowing a suit against
a state and an Ex parte Young action against a state officer is illusory. See id.at 1168;
see also Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L.
REv. 102, 126 (1996) (stating that "Ex parte Young, long ago confirmed that citizens
seeking prospective relief in suits against 'the state' could simply recast their complaints
as suits against state officials" thereby adjudicating their claims in a federal forum
(footnote omitted)). Theories on congressional abrogation have led only to further
incoherence in Eleventh Amendment interpretation. See Althouse, supra note 9, at 1168.
24 See Richard Monette, When Tribes Sue States: How "Federal Indian Law"
Offers
an Opportunity to Clarify Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
401, 433 (1994) (suggesting that the Supreme Court seize the opportunity presented by
the cases between states and tribes to clarify its position on Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence); see also Eric D. Jones, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: A
Forumfor Conflict Among the Plenary Power of Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the
Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L. REV. 127, 128 (1993) (noting the conflict among courts
regarding whether Congress possesses the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
cases involving tribal and state disputes).
Suits brought by tribes have generally been barred by the Eleventh Amendment with
three significant exceptions: (1) Congress's ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity
on behalf of the tribes; (2) state consent to suit or waiver of its Eleventh Amendment
immunity; and (3) application of the Ex parte Young doctrine. See William T. Bisset,
Tribal-State Gaming Compacts: The Constitutionality of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 77-78 (1993). In Blatchford v. Native Village, the
Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity barred suits brought by Indian Tribes. See
501 U.S. 775, 779-80, 782 (1991). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that
the Supreme Court already ruled on the applicability of sovereign immunity to suits
brought by foreign sovereigns.
See id. at 781 (citing Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934)).
25 See Bruce A. Wagman, Advancing Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Pathway to
Power, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 419 (1993). The history of tribal sovereignty is one of
inconsistencies; while tribes are referred to as "domestic-dependent sovereigns,"
Congress and the Supreme Court have treated tribes as "wards" of the United States.
See Mike McBride III, Oklahoma's Civil-Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Over Indian Activities
in Indian Country: A Critical Commentary on Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe Hous. Auth., 19
OKLA. CiTY U. L. REv. 81, 99 (1994). The Supreme Court has continually recognized
the congressional policy of fostering self-government for Indian tribes; Congress,
however, maintains a sort of trust relationship with tribes, often legislating on their
behalf. See id.at 97-98.

814

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:806

Amendment debate. 2 7 Some scholars believe that the Supreme Court's
treatment of suits brought by Indian Tribes against states may provide a

resolution to many Eleventh Amendment questions.28
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, in Seminole Tribe v.

Florida,29 considered

whether

states enjoy

Eleventh

Amendment

immunity in suits brought by Indian Tribes in federal court. 3 ° The Court
resolved the issue in favor of Florida, declaring that states were entitled
31
to Eleventh Amendment protection from suits brought by Indian Tribes.
Overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 32 the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress acting under its constitutionally enumerated
powers lacked the legislative authority to abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. 33 The Supreme Court gave effect to
that. policy
by simply• declaring 5 that federal courts lacked subject matter
.
34
jurisdiction over this dispute.
26

See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal

Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 697 (1989) (conceding that the federal courts have faced
difficulty in establishing the correct application of federal jurisprudence in cases
concerning federal Indian law).
27 See Sidney M. Wolf, Killing the New Buffalo: State Eleventh Amendment Defense
to Enforcement ofIGRA Indian Gaming Compacts, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
51, 55 (1995) (noting that conflicting judicial interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment
have led to an impasse in the negotiations between tribes and states on the gaming issue).
Gambling on Indian reservations provided many tribes with new opportunities and has
been hailed by its supporters as the "new buffalo." See id. at 53. Proponents of Indian
gaming have expressed concern that extension of the Eleventh Amendment to suits
brought by Indian tribes will kill the "new buffalo." See id. By refusing to negotiate the
tribal-state compact required under IGRA, states are "killing the new buffalo" and
essentially preventing tribes from reaping the economic benefits of operating casinos on
Indian lands. See id. at 55-58.
28 See Monette, supra note 24, at 433.
29 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
30 See id. at 1122.
31 See id. The majority denied jurisdiction based on several points. See id. First,
Florida did not consent to the lawsuit. See id. Second, Congress may not, pursuant to its
Article I powers, abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Finally, Ex parte
Young actions were not available in this case. See id.
32 491 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (5-4 decision).
See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, explained that the Eleventh Amendment immunized Florida from suit and
Congress may not, based on its enumerated powers, infringe on that grant of immunity.
See id. at 1131.
The Eleventh Amendment was intended as a check on Article III
jurisdiction, and, therefore, Congress may not bypass the constitutional limits placed on
jurisdiction through its Article I powers. See id. at 1131-32. Furthermore, the exception
furnished by Ex parte Young was not available in this case because Congress already
provided an enforcement scheme under IGRA. See id. at 1132, 1133.
34 See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (6th ed. 1990) (defining subject
matter
jurisdiction as a "court's power to hear and determine cases of the general class or
category to which proceedings in question belong; the power to deal with the general
subject involved in the action").
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In 1991, the Seminole Tribe of Florida, in preparation of opening a
gambling casino on their reservation, 36 attempted to negotiate a tribalstate compact 37 with Florida pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA). 38 When Florida declined the opportunity to enter into such
35 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Montecatini
Edison

S. % A., 342 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D. Del. 1972)).
See id. at 1121. There has been a great deal of debate on the issue of Indian
gaming. See Bisset, supra note 24, at 73. Critics claim that allowing gaming on Indian
lands will invite the involvement of organized crime. See id. Gaming industry executives
complain that the new competition will interfere with their business. See id. In addition,
state officials argue that the gaming will attract a great deal of money to the reservations
which cannot be taxed. See id. In contrast, supporters of Indian gaming contend that
allowing Indian gaming offers tribes an opportunity at achieving self-governance and
economic independence. See Marc S. Feinstein, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South
Dakota, Indian Gaming, and the State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Where Wll the
Conflict in the Circuits Fuse?, 39 S.D. L. REv. 604, 631 (1994); see also Edward P.
Sullivan, Note, Reshuffling the Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1107, 1111-12 (1995) (noting that tribal supporters
.contend [that] IGRA allows tribes to obtain long-overdue self sufficiency that, in turn,
instills tribal members with self worth" (footnote omitted)). The revenue from gaming
provides tribes with the funds to build schools, health facilities, and other necessities. See
Christopher J. Moore, Comment, What is Goodfor the Goose is Goodfor the Gambler:
How the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Fails to Abrogate State Immunity and Protects
Tribal Immunity, 21 OHIO N. U. L. REv. 1203, 1203 (1995).' While this has not resulted
in immediate prosperity for all tribes, there is hope that many tribes will enjoy success
similar to that of the Pequot Tribe's Foxwoods Resort Casino in Connecticut. See id. at
1203-04.
37 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (1994). A tribal-state compact, required by IGRA,
is a
bargain struck by the tribe and the state where that tribe's reservation is located, which
governs the operation of certain gaming activities. See Marianne T. Caulfield, Comment,
Vll it Take a Move by the New York Yankees for the Seneca Nation to Obtain a Class III
Gaming License?, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 279, 280 (1994).
38 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1994). In 1988, Congress passed the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which provides a statutory basis for state supervision of
Indian gaming. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119; 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994). The act was
intended to get around the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, which precluded state intervention in tribal gaming. See Seminole, 116
S. Ct. at 1124-25; see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202, 221 (1987) (noting that tribal interest in gaming outweighs California's "interest in
preventing the infiltration of the tribal bingo enterprises by organized crime"); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1019 (lth Cir. 1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
(noting that "[in order to achieve a compromise between the interests of the states and
the interests of the Indian tribes, Congress" enacted IGRA).
IGRA provides a role for states in the regulation of Indian gaming activities. See id.
The act does this by classifying gaming activities in one of three categories. See 25
U.S.C. § 2703(6)-(8) (1994). Class I gaming involves primarily social or traditional
games, usually for minimal stakes, that are "in connection with, tribal ceremonies or
celebrations." § 2703(6). These games are self-regulated. See id. § 2710(a)(1). Class II
gaming includes bingo, nonbank card games, and card games that operated prior to the
passage of the IGRA. See id. § 2703(7). Generally, these activities are legal within the
state and regulation is primarily by the tribes, with a supervisory role for the federal
government. See id. § 2710(c)(3)-(6). Class III gaming covers all other types of
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a compact,39 the tribe sought to achieve the same result by suing the State
and its Governor in federal court pursuant to the enforcement provisions
of IGRA. 40
The district court refused to grant the State's motion to dismiss, 4 '
based on its claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity, in light of recent
precedent allowing a similar suit. 42
Florida immediately filed an
interlocutory appeal 43 from the district court's denial of their motion to
dismiss."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
gambling such as casino games, slot machines, and lotteries. See id. § 2703(8). Various
requirements must be met for a tribe to engage in Class III gaming: (1) the tribe's
governing body must pass appropriate legislation to allow Class III gaming, which the
National Gaming Commission must approve; (2) the gambling must be legal within the
state where the Indian land is located; and (3) the gaming must be conducted in
accordance with a Tribal-State compact. See id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)-(C).
39 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1121.
States have a duty to negotiate tribal-state
compacts in good faith and failure to negotiate is regarded as bad faith. See §
2710(d)(7)(A)(i). IGRA provides in pertinent part:
The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over ... any cause
of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to
enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purposes of entering
into a Tribal-State compact.., or to conduct such negotiations in good
faith.
Id. This grant of jurisdiction, however, is restricted by § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i), which requires
tribes to wait a minimum of 180 days after the initial petition for a tribal-state compact
before filing suit against the state. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i).
40 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1121. The State of Florida filed a motion to dismiss,
invoking Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as a defense. See id. The district
court denied the motion and the State took an interlocutory appeal. See id. The Eleventh
Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, stating that sovereign immunity based on the
Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from suit. See id.
41 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11
F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), aft'd, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); see also FED. R. CIV. PRoc.
12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of a case if the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. See id.
42 See Seminole, 801 F.Supp. at 660. The district court employed a two-step analysis
for congressional abrogation, asking first whether Congress clearly intended to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment immunity and then whether Congress had the constitutional
authority to do so. See id. Finding that the congressional intent to abrogate sovereign
immunity was clear, the district court held that Congress acted appropriately when it
abrogated Florida's sovereign immunity pursuant to its power under the Indian
Commerce Clause. See id. at 657-58; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing
in part that "Congress shall have Power... [tlo regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
43 See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990) (defining interlocutory appeal
as
"lain appeal of a matter which is not determinable of the controversy, but which is
necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits").
44 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1020 (11th Cir. 1994), afid,
116 S.
Ct. 1114 (1996); see also Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 148 (1993) (providing an immediate interlocutory appeal when a claim of
Eleventh Amendment immunity is denied).
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Eleventh Circuit consolidated the Seminole case with a similar suit 45 and
considered the Eleventh Amendment argument on its merits.4 6 The
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that
Congress lacked the power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immuni by reference to the Federal Constitution's Indian Commerce
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court lacked
Clause.
jurisdiction despite clear Congressional intent to abrogate state immunity
48
Given the discretionary nature of negotiating a
in the federal statute.
court further held that the tribe could
appellate
the
tribal-state compact,
not maintain an Ex parte Young action against Florida's Governor.4 9
Noting the growing confusion 50 regarding the scope of state
immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court
45 See Seminole, 11

F.3d at 1018; see also Poarch Band of Creek Indians v.
Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 562 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (finding that Congress does not have
the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to its Indian Commerce Clause
powers). Chief Judge Alex T. Howard, Jr. of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, held, in this factually similar case, that states are shielded
from tribes' suits because of the Eleventh Amendment. See Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp.
at 562. In a related decision, the district court held that actions under both the Ex parte
Young doctrine and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were not available to confer jurisdiction in the
Poarch Band case. See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549,
1552-53 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
46 See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1019.
Unlike the decision reached by the Seminole
district court, other federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit have resolved the issue
differently by recognizing a state's claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Poarch
Band, 776 F. Supp. at 562 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought
pursuant to IGRA); see also Poarch Band, 784 F. Supp. at 1553 (holding that suits
against the Governor are also barred). The Eleventh Circuit consolidated Seminole and
Poarch Band because the legal issues were essentially the same. See Seminole, 11 F.3d
at 1018.
47 See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1019.
The Eleventh Circuit questioned the plurality
decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., and suggested that "a majority of the present
[Supreme] Court [might] disagree with Union Gas." Id. at 1027. Drawing a distinction
between the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause, the appellate
court concluded its Eleventh Amendment analysis by limiting the Union Gas holding to
conqressional abrogation authorized by the Interstate Commerce Clause. See id.
See id. at 1019. The Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning
and stated that Congress's intent to abrogate state immunity was clearly based on IGRA's
numerous references to states as defendants. See id.
49 See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028-29.
For an in-depth discussion of the Ex parte
Young doctrine see infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
See Jeffrey B. Mallory, Note, Congress' Authority to Abrogate a State's Eleventh
Amendment Immunity from Suit: Will Seminole Tribe v. Florida Be Seminal?, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 791, 812 (1995) (describing the intercircuit conflict regarding Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suits brought under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); see
also Feinstein, supra note 36, at 605 (noting the conflicting decisions of the circuit
courts).
In 1993, the Eighth Circuit held that Congress, pursuant to its Indian Commerce
Clause powers, can abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment Immunity. See Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 280-81 (8th Cir. 1993). The Ninth and
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granted certiorari. 51 The Court, holding that Congress may not, pursuant
to its Article I powers, abrogate the sovereign immunity granted to the
states by the Eleventh Amendment and that Ex parte Young actions are
precluded by IGRA, 52 affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal. 53
The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment analysis began with the
case of Hans v. Louisiana.54 The controversial case, decided in 1890,
has arguably governed Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence for the last
century.
The Hans Court determined that the Eleventh Amendment
clearly barred suits brought by out-of-state individuals, and tacitly

forbade all private actions against a non-consenting state, even those
brought by its own citizens.

Dismissing Hans's argument that the text

Tenth Circuits agreed and allowed similar suits. See Spokane Tribe v. Washington, 28
F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1994); Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir.
1994). In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Congress cannot abrogate sovereign
immunity based on its Indian Commerce Clause powers. See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028.
51 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995).
52 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132. The Supreme Court explained:
[wihere Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a
particular federal right, we have, in suits against federal officers, refused to
supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary ....
where
Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme ... a court should
hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action
against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young.
Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, the majority argued that because Congress already
established a remedial scheme in IGRA, the Supreme Court should not apply the Ex parte
Young doctrine. See id. at 1132, 1133.
53 See id. at 1122.
54 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
55 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 ("For over a century we have reaffirmed
that
federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States 'was not contemplated by the
Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.'"). Hans initially
filed suit in federal court alleging that the State of Louisiana had violated Article 1, § 10
of the Federal Constitution. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1, 3; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10 (stating that "[no State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts"). By failing to pay the value of bonds and
the attached interest coupons, Hans claimed that Louisiana impeded his federal right to
contract. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
The conflict centered on a recent amendment of the Louisiana State Constitution,
which stated that "'the coupon of said consolidated bonds falling due the First of January,
1880, be, and the same is hereby, remitted, and any interest taxes collected to meet said
coupons are hereby transferred to defray the expenses of the state government.'" Id. at
2. The amended Louisiana Constitution, Hans claimed, had impaired an earlier contract
made between the State and bond holders. See id. at 3. The attorney general responded
to Hans's claim by stating that the federal district court did not have jurisdiction over the
claim because the State did not consent to suit and sovereign immunity barred the action.
See id. The federal district court agreed with the attorney general and dismissed the case.
See id. at 4.
56 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. The Hans Court explained that although the text of the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude citizens from bringing suits against their own
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of the Eleventh Amendment should be interpreted as written, 57 the
Supreme Court held that a state could not be subjected to suit without its
consent.58
Two decades later in Ex parte Young, 59 the Supreme Court relaxed
its Eleventh Amendment position and allowed federal jurisdiction over a
state-officer defendant. 60 Recognizing the need for an exception to the
states, the spirit and intent of the Eleventh Amendment was clear; to bar all private
actions against states. See id. The Court stated that:
"[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and general
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State of the
Union."
Id. at 13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)). The Hans Court continued by criticizing the majority in Chisholm for
closely observing "the letter of the Constitution, without regard to former experience and
usage." Id. at 12. Justice Iredell, the Hans Court stated, correctly interpreted the role of
sovereign immunity and the Union's intent not to create new causes of action previously
unrecognized. See id.
57 See id. Textualists have criticized the liberties the Hans Court took with the
language of the Eleventh Amendment. See Marshall, supra note 19, at 1345, 1349. The
Court suggested that it was not unreasonable to believe that the Eleventh Amendment
means exactly what it says. See id. at 1351.
Ann Althouse, an adherent to textualism, stated that "[Hans] took the distinctly
limited language of the [E]leventh [A]mendment and conjured up an entirely new
dimension in which it could operate, excluding all federal question cases without regard
to the plaintiffs' citizenship." Athouse, supra note 9, at 1156. It seems unlikely that the
Supreme Court would render the same decision in Hans today that it did in 1890. See id.
Nevertheless, the Court seems intent on upholding precedent. See id. Therefore,
modern interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment unfortunately rely on the historical
rendition given in 1890 by the Hans Court rather than an interpretation from 1798 when it
was actually adopted. See Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1893. This has led to further
historical debate between diversity theorists and Hans devotees. See Marshall, supra
note 19, at 1350.
58 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 16. In addition, the Hans Court held that the Article III
language granting concurrent jurisdiction to federal courts and state courts indicated that
Congress did not intend to invest federal courts with a new and special jurisdiction. See
id. at 18. Reasoning that state courts could not entertain a suit instituted by an individual
against an unconsenting state, the Hans Court found that federal courts also lacked that
power. See id. at 18-19. The Supreme Court also responded to Hans's reliance on
Cohens v. Virginia, which reviewed a case in which the state was a defendant. See id. at
19 (citing 6 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 410 (1821)). The Hans majority noted that the Cohens
Court reviewed the Virginia Supreme Court decision based on its appellate jurisdiction
and did not attempt to use federal jurisdiction to hear the case. See id. The Hans Court
explained that reliance on Cohens here was incorrect because Cohens dealt with the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See id. The Hans majority concluded the
analysis by adopting Justice Iredell's rationale in the Chisholm dissent. See id. at 18-19
(citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 419, 445-46 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting)).
59 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
60 See id. at 155-56, 167. The legislature of Minnesota passed legislation that fixed
railroad rates. See id. at 128. Stockholders in the railroad companies instituted actions
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Eleventh Amendment grant of state sovereign immunity, the Supreme

Court crafted the Ex parte Young fiction. 61 While a direct action cannot
be brought against a state in federal court, the Supreme Court explained,
suits against renegade state officers were permissible.
The Ex parte
Young Court explained that state officers who violated federal laws were

not acting in their official capacity because states cannot authorize
violations of federal law. 63 Distinguishing suits brought against the state
64
from suits brought against individual state actors, the Supreme Court
commented that the sovereignty interest of individual states was not
implicated when a state officer was sued in federal court. 65 Thus, parties
seeking to frustrate a state's claim of sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment could bring an Ex parte Young action against a
state official. 66
against Edward T. Young, the Minnesota Attorney General, alleging that the Act was an
unconstitutional taking because the mandatory rates were too low. See id. at 129, 130.
Temporary restraining orders were issued restricting the railway companies from
publishing the rates and prohibiting Young from enforcing the Act. See id. at 132. The
circuit court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction that Young violated and was
sanctioned with an order of contempt. See id. at 133, 134. Young filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus and the court ordered him to show cause. See id. at 135. He
responded by claiming protection under the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 134. The
Supreme Court rejected Young's claim of immunity, stating:
[i]f the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation
of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under such
enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. The State has no power to impart him any immunity.
Id. at 159-60 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887)).
61 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress'sPower
to Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REv. 539, 545 (1995) (stating that "sovereign
immunity . . . created a new series of problems[,J ....

[floremost among these was the

problem of how federal law was ever to be enforced against the states"). The Ex parte
Young fiction relies on the theory that a state officer is not acting as an agent of the state
when his actions violate federal law. See id. at 546. As a result of this theory, a state
official may be stripped of Eleventh Amendment immunity whenever his actions
constitute a violation of constitutional or federal rights. See id. For an in-depth
discussion of the Ex parte Young fiction, see generally Althouse, supra note 9.
62 See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 154. The Exparte Young Court stated:
[i]t is the settled doctrine of this court that a suit against individuals for
the purpose of preventing them as officers of a State from enforcing an
unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, is not
a suit against the State within the meaning of that Amendment."
Id. (quoting Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898)).
63 See id. at 159, 159-60.
64 See id. at 155-56.
65 See id. at 159.
66 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L.
REV.

1141, 1196 (1988) (noting the paradox that a state defendant denied Eleventh Amendment
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Despite Ex parte Young, however, the Supreme Court generally
adhered to its holding in Hans, and twenty-six years later in Principality
of Monaco v. Mississippi 6 expanded its interpretation of the Eleventh
68
Amendment to shield states
from actions brought by foreign
9
The Principality of Monaco Court distinguished foreign
governments.

government suitors from the federal government or a sister state, which

protection may, for the same behavior, incur liability as a state actor for Fourteenth

Amendment violations).
Ex parte Young is limited in two ways: First, it may not be used to coerce a state
officer's performance of discretionary tasks and, second, it may not be employed when
for all intents and purposes the suit is really against the state. See Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. at 157, 158-59. Courts may only compel performance when the officer owes a
duty. See id. at 158. Ex parte Young, therefore, does not encompass discretionary acts.
See id. The Ex parte Young Court explained that "[tihe general discretion regarding the
enforcement of the laws when and as [the state officer] deems appropriate is not
interfered with by an injunction which restrains the state officer from taking any steps
toward the enforcement of an unconstitutional enactment."
Id. at 159. When an
injunction is issued in this context, it only bars the officer from performing
unconstitutional actions. See id. The Supreme Court in Ex parte Young asserted:
[iun making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin the
enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional it is plain that such
officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else
it is merely making him a party as a representative of the State, and
thereby attempting to make the State a party.
Id. at 157.
The Supreme Court also held that Ex parte Young may not be employed when the
intention is really to sue a state. See id. A suit is considered to be against a state when
the judgment is satisfied by using state funds or when the judgment impermissibly limits
the government's actions. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
101 n. 11 (1984) (explaining that suits are regarded as against a state when the damages
are paid from state funds or alternatively when the judgment granted affects the state's
ability to act independently).
6P 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
68 See id.at 330. The Principalityof Monaco Court agreed with James Madison that
Article III, § 2, cl.1 of the United States Constitution only grants federal jurisdiction over
suits brought by a foreign state against a consenting state. See id. Reasoning that an
action by a foreign state does not differ from one brought by a private individual, the
Court upheld Mississippi's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id.The Court continued
by explaining that a foreign state has a reciprocal benefit in that it also enjoys immunity
from suit brought by a state. See id.
69 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1156-57 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322. The Principality sought
permission to bring suit against Mississippi after the State refused to redeem bonds it had
issued. See id.at 317. Mississippi pled a number of defenses including that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the proposed suit. See id.at 318-19. Although the text of the
Eleventh Amendment does not explicitly preclude such suits, the Principality of Monaco
Court held that the spirit of the Amendment insists that "a State may not be sued without
her consent." Id. at 321. The Principality of Monaco Court relied on Hans, indicating
that the mere mention of a suit arising under Article III does not confer jurisdiction over a
nonconsenting state. See id. at 322.
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may proceed against another state under the plan of convention theory. 70
That theory, the Court explained, rests on the belief that states implicitly
waived or consented to such suits by joining the Union. 71 Accordingly,
foreign governments who are independent entities and who have not
submitted to the power of the U.S. Government, cannot utilize the plan
of convention waiver to sue a state. 72 Furthermore, the Court explained,

a foreign government enjoys immunity from actions brought against it in

the United States. 73 Therefore, the Court stated, the plan of convention
74
theory does not apply to foreign sovereigns.
Forty-two years later in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,75 the Supreme Court
tempered its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment by holding that
76
the
provisions
of 77the By
Fourteenth
Amendment
necessarily
limitenforcement
state sovereign
immunity.
making states
more accountable
to

70 See Principalityof Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322-23. Justice Hughes
explained that
"waiver or consent, on the part of a State, which inheres in the acceptance of the
constitutional plan, runs to the other States who have likewise accepted that plan, and to
the United States as the sovereign which the Constitution creates." Id. at 330. The plan
of convention theory suggests that, by ratifying the Constitution, the states agreed to
mutually consent to suit. See id. at 328-29. The theory also concludes that states submit
to suits brought by the federal government. See id. at 329.
71 See id. at 328-29.
72 See id. at 330.
73 See id.

74 See id. at 323, 330, 331. The Supreme Court concluded that the Principality
of
Monaco was in no better position to sue the State of Mississippi than the private
individuals who donated the bonds. See id. at 332. The Court therefore denied the
application to bring suit. See id.
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
76 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant
part that:
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. § 1. The majority explained that the Eleventh Amendment is essentially limited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. The Fourteenth Amendment
contemplates a role for federal regulation of state powers and, as such, limitations on the
defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity is appropriate. See id.
77 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448. Fitzpatrick initiated this action pursuant
to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. On behalf of all male employees and retirees,
he alleged that certain portions of Connecticut's statutory benefit plan discriminated on
the basis of sex. See id. The district court granted injunctive relief but denied retroactive
benefits and damages because the court believed that allowing recovery against the State's
treasury would violate Edelman v. Jordan. See id. at 449-50 (citing Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974)). On appeal, the Supreme Court held that damages
normally precluded by Edelman are necessarily allowed under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 456-57.
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the people, 8 and ensuring that federal rights are protected, the
Fitzpatrick Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment altered the
balance of state and federal power. 79 Therefore, the Court noted,
Congress, acting pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers, is free
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 8°
A decade later in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,81 the
Supreme Court opened the door for expansion of its Fitzpatrick holding
by contemplating how Congress indicates its intention to abrogate state
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.8 2 The Atascadero Court
78 See id. at 453.

The terms of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplate limits of state

powers and mandate respect for the federal rights of individuals. See id.
79 See id. at 454. The Supreme Court expressed the importance
of maintaining a
balance of power in the federal system. See id. In addition, the Fitzpatrick Court noted
that "Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against
States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." Id. at
456 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
so See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (providing that "Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
81 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
82 See id. at 236. The respondent, Scanlon, who suffered from both
diabetes and
blindness in one eye, filed suit against Atascadero State Hospital charging that the
hospital violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See id. (citing Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)) (providing that federally funded programs may not
discriminate against handicapped individuals). The hospital, arguing that it was a state
entity, sought a dismissal of the case based on the Eleventh Amendment's grant of
immunity. See id. The district court dismissed the action because Scanlon failed to make
out a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act. See id. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. See id.
(citing Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1982)).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision. See
id. at 236-37. On remand, the Ninth Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment was not
applicable in this case because the State consented to suit when the hospital accepted
federal funds. See id. at 237; see also Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359,
361 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974)). As a result of
an intercircuit conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 237 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 469 U.S. 1032 (1984)).
The Supreme Court rejected Scanlon's three arguments that the suit should be
allowed. See id. at 240. The majority in Atascadero began by stating that California's
Constitution, which has a provision allowing waiver of the Eleventh Amendment, did not
waive immunity in this case. See id. at 241; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5. Next the
Atascadero Court explained that Congress did not clearly express in the statutory
language its intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment grant of sovereign immunity.
See 473 U.S. at 246. Finally, the Atascadero Court explained that receipt of federal
funds was not conditioned on California's consent to suit. See id. at 247. The majority
in Atascadero stressed that "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured
immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute." Id. at 242. The Court further stated that "the fundamental
nature of the interests implicated by the Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion."
Id.
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concluded that Congress must make its intention to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment unmistakably clear and that such
intent will be found by
83
focusing solely on the language of a statute.
Although the Atascadero majority did not explicitly hold that
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under its plenary
powers, Justice Brennan alluded to that possibility in the dissenting
opinion 8 4
Criticizing the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment
doctrine as lacking both a textual basis and a historical foundation, 5
Justice Brennan opined that the Court's Eleventh Amendment
interpretation86 was unclear as to exactly when Congress had the power
to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. 87 Justice Brennan did argue,
however, that the Constitution was clear. 8 The grant of power in
Articles I and III, according to Justice Brennan, was unmistakable and
Congress could subject states to federal jurisdiction as long as that grant
of jurisdiction did not conflict with another constitutional provision. 89
Justice Brennan concluded by stating that the Eleventh Amendment could
not act as a limit on Congress's lawmaking authority. 90
Answering the invitation extended by Justice Brennan in
Atascadero, the Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,"
held that Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under
its plenary powers, specifically the powers granted to Congress under the
83 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at
243.
84 See id. at 253 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Justice Brennan acknowledged "that the
supposed lack of judicial power may be remedied ... by express congressional
abrogation pursuant to the Civil War Amendments... or perhaps pursuant to other
congressional powers." Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
6See id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 258 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment results in a disturbing paradox: federal courts
must deny jurisdiction to cases that arise from a state actor's violation of a federal law or
8See id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that it is "impossible to determine to
what extent the principle of state accountability to the rule of law [is balanced with] the

Court's sovereign immunity doctrine").
88 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 See id. Justice Brennan explicitly
stated:
If Congress acting within its Article I or other powers creates a legal right
and remedy, and if neither the right nor the remedy violates any provision
of the Constitution outside Article III, then Congress may entrust
adjudication of claims based on the newly created right to the federal

courts--even if the defendant is a State. Neither Article III nor the
Eleventh Amendment imposes an independent limit on the lawmaking
authority of Congress.
Id.

90 See id.
91

491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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Interstate Commerce Clause. 92 In Union Gas, the plurality found that
Congress clearly expressed an intention to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 93 Believing that Congress was acting under a
valid grant of authority, the Union Gas plurality reasoned that states
waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity by ratifying the
Constitution, thereby relinquishing power over interstate commerce to
Congress .
The decision of Seminole Tribe v. Florida95 returned Eleventh

Amendment analysis to its pre-twentieth century state when the United
States Supreme Court determined that the Amendment protects both a
state and its officers from suits expressly permitted by Congress under its
Article I powers. 96 Moreover, the Seminole Court explicitly discouraged
the use of judicially fashioned remedies for state violations of federal
rights when Congress, through statutory provisions, had already provided
curative procedures .
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that
Congress intended the federal statute at issue to provide a role for states
92 See id. at 3. Seeking to recover the costs it expended by cleaning
up the
environmental wastes caused by the Union Gas Company, the United States sued Union
Gas pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). See id. at 6; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994) (stating
the remedial powers available to the President under CERCLA); id. § 9606 (authorizing
suits to recover monies expended on clean up). The Union Gas Company impleaded the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, charging that the State's actions exacerbated the
damages. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6. The district court dismissed Union Gas's
claim, stating that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit. See id. The Third Circuit
affirmed the district court, explaining that the language of CERCLA did not clearly
express Congress's intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. See id. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated the Third Circuit's decision, and remanded the case
based on the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). See id.
On remand, the Third Circuit determined that in light of SARA, CERCLA did intend to

abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Furthermore, the Third Circuit
found that Congress may abrogate the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to its Commerce
Clause power. See id. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari. See Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 485 U.S. 958 (1988).
93 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 13 (noting that CERCLA, as amended
by SARA,
clearly expresses Congress's intent to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity).
94 See id. at 14. The plurality in Union Gas explained that "'Ubly empowering
Congress to regulate commerce ... the States necessarily surrendered any portion of
their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation.'" Id. (quoting Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)) (other citations omitted).
95 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (5-4 decision).
96 See id. at 1129. The Supreme Court explains that the question of Congress's
ability to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment has remained open, save the decision in
Union Gas. See id. Therefore, the Seminole Court reasoned that "fidelity to [the
Supreme Court's] century-old doctrine," first opined in Hans, is necessary. Id.
See id. at 1132.
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in controlling Indian gaming. 9 8 Discussing IGRA's guidelines for tribal
gaming, the Chief Justice explained that the statute granted federal
jurisdiction to all controversies arising under its provisions. 9 9 The
Seminole Court focused on two questions raised by this conflict: (1)
whether congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity in IGRA
was clear and if that abrogation was constitutionally sanctioned; and (2)
whether, alternatively, the doctrine of Ex parte Young may be used to
bring suit against the Governor of Florida if the Eleventh Amendment
barred federal jurisdiction under IGRA. 100
Describing the 1890 decision in Hans v. Louisiana, Chief Justice
Rehnquist began the Seminole Court's Eleventh Amendment analysis.' 01
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the Hans Court correctly
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as a jurisdictional bar to private
actions brought against states in federal court.1 2 Although the language
of the Eleventh Amendment literally does not grant the states sovereign
immunity, Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted that the principles and
postulates behind the Constitution demand it.10 3 The Hans Court's
interpretation, the Chief Justice posited, was more historically accurate
10 4
than the explanation offered by Justice Souter's Seminole dissent.
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Hans Court, working from a closer
vantage point, better understood the legislative reaction to Chisholm v.
Georgia. 05 Therefore, the Chief Justice concluded that adherence06 to the
Hans interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment was appropriate.'
Next, the Seminole majority discussed Atascadero State Hospital,
which was the first Eleventh Amendment case to apply the Supreme

98 See id. at 1119 (noting that Congress passed IGRA to provide a role for states in
the governance of Indian gaming); see also Mark C. Wenzel, Note, Let the Chips Fall

Where They May:

The Spokane Indian Tribe's Decision to Proceed with Casino

Gambling Without a State Compact, 30 GONZ. L. REv. 467, 467 (1995) (noting the

reasons Congress listed for passing IGRA were to encourage "'tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.'" (footnote omitted)).
99 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (1994)
(granting federal courts jurisdiction over claims arising under IGRA).
103
101

See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122.
See id. (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)).

02 See id. at 1127-28.
103 See id. at 1129 (citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321-23
(1934)).
104 See id. at 1130. Chief Justice Rehnquist chided Justice Souter for submitting a
"dissent ... [that] disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together from law

review articles and its own version of historical events." Id. at 1129-30.
105 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1130.
106 See id. at 1127-28, 1129.
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10 7
Court's interpretational device known as the "clear statement" rule.
Continuing, the Chief Justice noted that Dellmuth v. Muth'0 8 severely
narrowed the clear statement rule by requiring that the statutory language
of the legislative act in question indicate Congress's intent to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment. 1°9 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that given
the Eleventh Amendment's essential role in the constitutional framework,
nothing short of an unmistakably clear expression of congressional intent
to abrogate that immunity will suffice." 10 Utilizing the above principles
of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the majority determined that
Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when it passed
IGRA."'
The majority next distinguished the Court's opinion in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer from the present case. 1 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist began by
explaining that the congressional abrogation in Fitzpatrick was valid
because it was based on the Fourteenth Amendment. 113 The Chief Justice
then explained that the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifically
reserves the right to enforce federal laws against state defendants,
changed the balance between federal and state power. 114 The Court
concluded its discussion of Fitzpatrick by noting that the case should not
be read as a limitation on sovereign immunity. 115

After concluding its review of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence,
the Seminole majority overruled Union Gas and considered whether
congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in IGRA was
107 See id.at 1123; see also Christopher T. Handman, Note, The Doctrine of Political
Accountability and Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Applying a New External Constraintto
Congress's Exceptions Clause Power, 106 YALE L.J. 197, 218 (noting that "[tihe
Supreme Court's 'clear statement' rule in Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
cases .... is predicated on two concerns: [first] to provide clear notice to those who
may be affected by Congress's actions and [second] to ensure that Congress seriously
deliberates whether to trump a constitutional right.").
108 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989).
109 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123 (citing Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 227-28).

See id.
III See id.at 1124.
112 See id. at 1128.
110

113 See id. The Seminole Court explained:

Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplicable to the Interstate
Commerce Clause [or Indian Commerce Clause], viz, that the Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment

and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the preexisting
balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment.
Id.(citation omitted).
114 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
115 See id.(quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
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clear. 116 Noting that congressional intent to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity was explicit, 117 the Chief Justice next considered
whether Congress's abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment grant of
sovereign immunity was constitutionally permissible. 18s Chief Justice
Rehnquist determined that Congress, acting pursuant to its Indian
Commerce Clause powers, did not have the authority to enact the IGRA
provision that abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity. 119
Drawing a distinction between the two types of cases where the
Supreme Court had previously allowed Eleventh Amendment abrogation,
the majority explained that only the Fourteenth Amendment confers
12 °
congressional authority to override the Eleventh Amendment.
Comparing the two, the Chief Justice explained that abrogation based on
Article I powers, such as the Indian Commerce Clause, was a perversion
of the Framers' original intent.1 2 1 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the Framers would not have barred federal jurisdiction over a state with
the Eleventh Amendment while at the same time allowing Congress to
abrogate that immunity under its Article I powers. 122 Chief Justice
Rehnquist further distinguished the Fourteenth Amendment from other
congressional powers by explaining that the Amendment clearly provided
a role for congressional enforcement of federal rights.123 Therefore, the
Chief Justice reasoned that abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity based on Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers was
116 See id. at 1123-24, 1128.
117 See id.at 1123-24, 1124.
lower court and "virtually

In addition, the majority relied on the findings of the

every other court that has confronted the question that

Congress has in § 2710(d)(7) provided an 'unmistakably clear' statement of its intent to
abrogate." id.at 1123-24 (footnote omitted).
See id.at 1124.
19 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
120 See id.at 1128. The Chief Justice noted that the Fourteenth Amendment's power

to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment rests in part on the date of its passage. See id.The
Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment clearly contemplated the federal
government's restriction of state power, and consequently, the Eleventh Amendment's
jurisdictional bar is necessarily lifted. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the

Fourteenth Amendment "operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and
federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment." Id.
121 See id. at 1130.
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized Justice Souter's dissent,
commenting that the Justice mischaracterized statements made by several of the framers.

See id.

122 See id.at 1128. The Chief Justice explained that the plurality in Union Gas relied
Article I [powers] expand the
on the erroneous belief that "Congress could under [its]
scome of the federal courts' jurisdiction [permitted] under Article III."Id.

See id.at 1125. The majority explained that "through the Fourteenth Amendment,
federal power extend[s] to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and
therefore that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allow[s] Congress to abrogate the
immunity from suit guaranteed by [the Eleventh] Amendment." Id.
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permissible. 124 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited both the faulty logic of the
Union Gas plurality opinion125 and the problems that lower courts have
faced in their application, as motivation for the majority's decision not to
apply it as precedent. 12 6 The Supreme Court then overruled Union Gas,
the only case that found congressional authority to abrogate state
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under the Interstate Commerce
Clause. 127
Next, the Seminole majority considered whether the Ex parte Young
doctrine should be applicable in cases such as the present one. 12 Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained that judicially crafted remedies like Ex parte
Young should be administered cautiously. 129 Furthermore, the Chief
Justice suggested that IGRA provides an adequate remedial scheme for
tribes to gain state cooperation, or alternatively, to bypass state authority
to engage in tribal gaming by application to the Secretary of the
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that interference by the
Interior.
Supreme Court, specifically through an authorization of suit under 1Ex
31
parte Young, would undercut the enforcement provisions of IGRA.
The Seminole majority continued by comparing the relatively mild
sanctions authorized under IGRA with the more severe sanctions

124 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125.
125

See id. at 1127.

The Chief Justice stressed that there was no majority decision in

Union Gas. See id. Noting that only three justices supported Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that Justice White wrote separately to
explain that while he agreed with the plurality in result he explicitly rejected its rationale.
See id. In addition, the Chief Justice stated that lower courts have struggled and strained
to correctly apply the Union Gas plurality's rationale. See id.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 1131. The Chief Justice
stated that:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle
of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so
ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the
regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress
Federal Government.
complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties
against unconsenting States.
Id. (footnote omitted).
12 See id. at 1132.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 1132-33; see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 431 (stating that
when Congress establishes remedial provisions, the Supreme Court should defer to these
statutory remedies). The Seminole Court stated that Congress had clearly provided such
remedial procedures for enforcement in the present case. See 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
Therefore, the majority concluded that the only issue remaining was whether an Ex parte
Young action should be permitted. See id. at 1132.
131 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
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available in Ex parte Young actions. 132 The Seminole majority concluded
that if Congress intended for tribes to sue under Ex parte Young, then the
enforcement 13 rovisions of IGRA would be rendered completely

unnecessary.
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded the Court's opinion by
proclaiming that the Eleventh Amendment may only be abrogated by
Congress pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers and

that the Ex parte Young doctrine is inapplicable in this case.134
Consequently, the Seminole Court held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the tribe's suit, and accordingly, affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's dismissal. 135
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, rejected the
majority's conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment shields states from
suits explicitly authorized by Congress under its plenary powers.136
Furthermore, Justice Souter stated that the majority's determination that
the Ex parte Young doctrine is not applicable to this case cannot be
justified. 3' 7
of the
Justice Souter characterized the majority's interpretation
138
Justice Souter
Eleventh Amendment as fundamentally misguided.
began the dissent's analysis by recounting the early history of sovereign
immunity and its development in colonial America. 139 Explaining the
debate among the Framers regarding sovereign immunity, Justice Souter
132

See id. The Chief Justice stated that "[bly contrast with [the modest sanctions

provided in IGRA], an action brought against a state official under Ex parte Young would
expose that official to the full remedial powers of a federal court, including, presumably,
contempt sanctions." Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist continued by asking why, if Ex parte
Young relief was available in the present case, a tribe would endure the more timeconsuming provisions of IGRA enforcement for significantly lesser relief? See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137 See id.at 1181 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138 See id.at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting).
139 See id.at 1147 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally id.at 1165-69 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the debate among the Framers concerning sovereign immunity).
Justice Souter suggested that while some of the Framers were at odds regarding the
importance of sovereign immunity, the fact that the Constitution itself is silent on the issue
of sovereign immunity indicates that states did not enjoy immunity for breaches of federal
law. See id.at 1147 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Justice stated that the Eleventh
Amendment's text provided immunity only from suits brought in federal court based on
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. See id.at 1146 (Souter, J.,dissenting). Justice
Souter explained that the Framers were wary of granting state governments total
immunity and that their "hostility to the implicit reception of common-law doctrine as
federal law" made it unlikely that they would have supported a total bar of actions against
states. Id.

1997]
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contended that disagreement centered around the availability of diversity

jurisdiction as a means of haling a state into federal court. 140 While this
conflict was settled by Hans, Justice Souter argued that the Hans Court
misread Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia, and thus
erroneously applied it to federal question cases.
Justice Iredell's
dissent in Chisholm, according to Justice Souter, focused on the Judicial 2

Act of 1789 rather than on the constitutional limits of Article III.

Justice Souter opined that Justice Iredell's dissent dealt with sovereign

immunity as an aspect of federal common law' 43 rather than as a tenet of
constitutional law. 144 Therefore, Justice Souter explained, when the
Supreme Court applied Justice Iredell's reasoning in Chisholm to Hans,
the Hans error was born. 145 Justice Souter concluded this section of the
dissent by stating that neither the historical roots of the Eleventh
140

See id. at 1150 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained that:

The Framers may, as Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall argued, have
contemplated that federal courts would respect state immunity law in
diversity cases, but the generalized principle of immunity that today's
majority would graft onto the Constitution itself may well never have
developed with any common clarity and, in any event, has not been shown
to have existed.
Id. at 1164 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter returned to the question of how the Framers perceived adoption of the
common law and sovereign immunity. See id. at 1165 (Souter, J., dissenting). Speaking
at length -on the views of both Madison and Hamilton, the Justice established that the
Framers did not believe that all the principles of English common law were tacitly
incorporated into the Constitution. See id. at 1164-65 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter then explained that the rationale behind common-law sovereign immunity, that a
sovereign as the font of law may not be sued, does not apply to states when there is a
claim based on federal law because the federal government rather than the state is the
source of authority. See id. at 1170-71 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Justice concluded
that:
[gliven the Framers' general concern with curbing abuses by state
governments, it would be amazing if the scheme of delegated powers
embodied in the Constitution had left the National Government powerless
to render the States judicially accountable for violations of federal rights.
Id. at 1171 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1149 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining
that Justice
Iredell's dissent in Chisholm did not contemplate the limits or jurisdiction available under
Article III, but focused on the Judiciary Act of 1789). Justice Souter maintained that
federal question suits in which a state is a party are permissible in spite of the Eleventh
Amendment. See id. at 1151-52 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Justice pointed out that
Theodore Sedgwick, a representative of Massachusetts, introduced an Amendment
barring federal question claims and that Congress rejected it in favor of the present
Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 1150 (Souter, J., dissenting).
142 See id.
143 See id. at 1160 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144 See id.
145 See id.

at 1149 n.7, 1153 (Souter, J., dissenting) (referring to the decision in Hans
as a "century-old mistake").
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Amendment nor its text supported the reading that the Amendment barred
all actions brought by citizens against states. 46

Justice Souter then turned to the role of precedent in Eleventh
Amendment analysis.' 47 Explaining the political environment in which
Hans was decided, 4 a Justice Souter insisted that present Eleventh
Amendment analysis stems from Hans's legal error. 149 This error,
Justice Souter explained, was compounded when the Principality of
Monaco decision expanded the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment to exclude all private suits.'
Justice Souter
complained that the faulty logic utilized in the Hans decision now

plagued Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as precedent.1 5' The Justice
further commented that the Seminole Court committed a serious error by
constitutional izing Hans.152

Justice Souter argued that the Supreme

Court should recognize the Hans decision as an example of federal

common law. 153 Such a course,
Justice Souter opined, would satisfy the
54
1
decisis.
stare
of
strictures
Justice Souter further contended that the majority erred by failing to
apply Ex parte Young to this case.155 Justice Souter suggested that the
majority in Seminole, by attempting to destroy Ex parte Young's role in
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, had disturbed decades of
precedent. 56 Furthermore, Justice Souter stated that the Seminole
majority gave no adequate explanation for its failure to apply Ex parte

Young.
Justice Souter argued that utilizing Ex parte Young jurisdiction
here would not be supplemental to Congress's remedial scheme because
146 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1165, 1185 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating
that "the

Hans Court and the Court today cannot reasonably argue that something like the old
immunity doctrine somehow slipped in as a tacit but enforceable background principle")
(citation omitted).
147 See id. at 1152-53 (Souter, J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 1155 (Souter, J., dissenting).
When Hans was decided, a number of
states owed Civil War debts, which they did not intend to repay and thus the decision was
most likely influenced by the political tensions of the day. See id. n. 16.
149 See id. at 1159-60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 1156-57 (Souter, J. dissenting) (quoting Principality of
Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)).
151 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1159 (Souter, J., dissenting).
152 See id. at 1153 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[The Supreme] Court's further
step today
of constitutionalizing Hans's rule against abrogation by Congress compounds and
immensely magnifies the century-old mistake of Hans itself and takes its place with other
historic examples of textually untethered elevations of judicially derived rules to the status
of inviolable constitutional law.").
153 See id. at 1184 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154 See id.

155 See id. at 1178, 1181 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156
157

See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1180 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1181 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the majority had already struck down those provisions as violative of the
Dwelling on Ex parte Young's jurisdictional
Eleventh Amendment.
nature, Justice Souter suggested that IGRA's mention of the state as a
defendant did not foreclose the use of the officer suit fiction. 159 Urging
the Seminole majority to return to the correct interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment, Justice Souter concluded his opinion by stating
that the precedent, the history, and the text of the Eleventh Amendment
itself all demand that the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction over this
dispute. 160
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens supported Justice Souter by
characterizing the majority's decision as "profoundly misguided.",
Commenting that this decision is really about congressional power,
Justice Stevens expressed his concern that the majority had needlessly
broken with precedent and, as a result, unduly restricted the power of
Congress. 162 Criticizing the majority's analysis as both illogical and
unjustifiable, Justice Stevens opined that the majority's sweeping
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment was based on the incorrect
assumption that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to shield states
from all private suits, regardless of their subject matter. 163
Justice Stevens recounted the history of the Eleventh Amendment
and its development by the judiciary. 164 Endorsing Justice Brennan's
158 See id. at 1182-83 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter noted that Ex parte
Young jurisdiction would not supplement IGRA, but rather that Ex parte Young would
provide "the sole jurisdictional basis for an Article III court's enforcement of a clear
federal statutory obligation, without which a congressional act would be rendered a nullity
in a federal court." Id. at 1182 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159 See id. at 1183 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160 See id. at 1185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 See i. at 1133, 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Monaghan, supra note 23,

at 121 (stating that the Seminole opinion is representative of the Supreme Court's desire

to return to an interpretation of the Constitution that recognizes individual states as
sovereigns). Monaghan argues that:
the [Supreme] Court rejected clear constitutional text in preference to
unarticulated and debatable historical explanations because of the power of
symbolism. This may have the effect of making the other, political
branches of the federal government-and the people-aware that the status
of states should be treated with extra care when constructing future
legislation.
Id.
163 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens
explained that the Court's reliance on the false belief that the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to shield states from most private suits, has compounded this mistake with the
erroneous conclusion that the Amendment abrogates Congress's power to subject states to
suit, save the "narrow... exception of statutes enacted pursuant to ... the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
164 See id.
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textualist interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,1 65 the Justice
166
explained that the Eleventh Amendment should be read as written.
Justice Stevens argued that the Seminole majority's reliance on Hans and
Principality of Monaco was misplaced. 167 The Justice concluded the
analysis of precedent by suggesting that the Court could correct its

interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment without overruling Hans. 6
Justice Stevens concluded the dissent by stating that the majority's

decision may not prevent the tribe from operating a casino in light of the
Eleventh Circuit's analysis of IGRA.

69

The Justice chided the majority

for its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.1 7

The Supreme

Court, in the Justice's opinion, should rely on analysis of the
Constitution7 and congressional dictates rather than blind devotion to
precedent. 1 '
Once again the Supreme Court has shied away from an opportunity
to end the confusion surrounding the Eleventh Amendment. 172 By
165

See id.at 1136 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).

See id.
167 See id. at 1137, 1139, 1140 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166

Justice Stevens opined that
"it is quite startling to learn that the reasoning of Hans and [Principality oA]
Monaco... should have a stare decisis effect on the question of whether Congress
possesses the authority to provide a federal forum .... [iun light of the [Supreme]
Court's development of a clear statement line of jurisprudence .
Id.
I..."at 1140
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
168 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1137 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Despite the majority's
contention that "precedent compels" adherence to Hans, Justice Stevens maintained that
"Hans did not announce a constitutionally mandated jurisdictional bar." Id.
169 See id. at 1144 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens explained that the
Eleventh Circuit read IGRA as providing the Seminole Tribe with recourse to the
Executive branch. See id.
170 See id.
171 See id. Justice Stevens castigated the Seminole majority by stating:
While I am persuaded that there is no justification for permanently
enshrining the judge-made law of sovereign immunity, I recognize that
federalism concerns-and even the interest in protecting the solvency of
the States that was at work in Chisholm and Hans--may well justify a grant
of immunity for federal litigation in certain classes of cases. Such a grant,
however, should be the product of a reasoned decision by the policymaking branch of our government. For this Court to conclude that timeworn shibboleths iterated and reiterated by judges should take precedence
over the deliberations of the Congress of the United States is simply
irresponsible.
Id.

See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301-02 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan explained that the Supreme Court has relied on Hans for too
long. See id. The Justice pointed out that many states have done away with state
immunity in state-law actions. See id.at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
stated that "current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of liberty under law by protecting the
States from the consequences of their illegal conduct." Id.
172

1997]
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perpetuating the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and
curtailing the usage of the Ex parte Young doctrine in this case, the
Seminole Court has insured that this area of constitutional law will
remain confused and misunderstood. 173
Treating the Eleventh
Amendment as a subject matter bar, the Supreme Court has even put into
question whether courts are74 now obliged to raise the Eleventh
Amendment issue sua sponte.1
Ironically, application of state immunity in this case may not keep
the Indian Tribes from opening casinos. The Seminole Court's holding
that this controversy cannot be adjudicated in federal court may have
completely removed states from any part of that decision-making process
based on the provision in IGRA that allows tribes to petition the
75
Secretary of the Interior if negotiations with a state are unsuccessful.1
Alternatively, this decision may prove to ensure that tribes have no
remedy under IGRA. Either way, the states are in essentially the same
position that they were in after the Supreme Court's decision in
Cabazon-unable to regulate tribal gaming.
What will be the impact of this decision on Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence beyond tribal gaming? The Seminole Court's conclusion
will, no doubt, further limit state accountability. 177 Moreover, the rulin
raises questions about the enforceability of federally-created rights.
173

See Gibbons, supra note

1, at 1891

("The [E]leventh

[A]mendment today

represents little more than a hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually indefensible
judge-made law."); see also Massey, supra note 5, at 71 (noting the problematic
character of present Eleventh Amendment law).
174 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
sua sponte as "[oif
his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion").
175 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 n.4 (explaining that the Eleventh
Circuit read
IGRA, after striking the statute's grant of federal jurisdiction, as allowing tribes
"recourse to the Secretary of the Interior"); id. at 1144 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see
id. at 1133 n.18 (stating that the majority expresses no opinion concerning the Eleventh
Circuit's substitute remedy).
176 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22
(1987)
(holding that in states where gambling is permitted, tribes may conduct gaming activities
without state interference).
177 But see Monaghan, supra note 23, at 122 (noting that the Eleventh Amendment
is
really about "forum selection" and that state courts are available to hear many of the
cases that are barred from federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment).
178 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens voiced
concerns that the majority precludes not only Indian tribe suits but also "prevents
Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States, from
those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy,
environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy."
Id. (footnote

omitted).
The Chief Justice responded to Justice Stevens's concerns by noting that states are
rarely parties to these types of federal law claims and that any damages from restricting
federal jurisdiction in these cases would be minimal. See id. at 1131-32 n.16.
In
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Certainly there are federally-created rights that states will now be free to
violate with impunity. For example, individuals with patent or copyright
infringement claims against individual states may be denied a forum
179
because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Additionally, the decision in Seminole will allow states to claim Eleventh
Amendment immunity whenever an action does not arise under the
Fourteenth Amendment. No remedy will be available and the unfortunate
result is that certain individual federal rights will be completely
unprotected.
By overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the
Supreme Court has ensured that this controversy' 8 ° will remain in the
forefront of constitutional litigation.
While the autonomy this decision guarantees for states no doubt
enhances their sovereignty,' 81 this contrived reading of the Eleventh
Amendment will probably not further state authority. Decisions like
Seminole may in fact undercut congressional confidence in the ability of
individual states to handle federal issues. After all, Florida's behavior in
this case indicated that states cannot be trusted to act in good faith when
Congress provides a role for them in an area of federal concern. Unable
to rely on states to respect federally-created rights or keep a bargain, the
federal government may have no choice but to exclude states from these
decisions. Ultimately, this will diminish the role that states can play in
areas of national concern.
Colleen F. Walsh

addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that other remedies for state violations of
federal law are available. See id. at 1130 n.14.

179 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
180 See Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 323 (recounting the muddled and confused

history of the Eleventh Amendment and the Supreme Court's application of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity).
181 See Monaghan, supra note 23, at 121.

